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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET				
SUBJECT: (Optional)				
FROM: ⁰³ (Daniel Niesciur) CI/OG/SO		EXTENSION 1731	NO. DATE 7 June 1976	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Chief, CI Staff			(h)	<p>I prepared this memo for you. I have a copy for my working file.</p> <p>P.S. I sent you the Scott Breckinridge memo yesterday - hence is not attached.</p> <p>SECRET/SENSITIVE</p> <p>BY HAND</p> <p>To 3: Thanks (h)</p>
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3. ⁰³ (Niesciur)				
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SECRET/SENSITIVE

7 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Select Senate Committee Draft Report on President Kennedy Assassination

1. Per your direction, I accompanied Mr. Scott Breckinridge of the IG Staff to the Senate Office Building to review the SSC Report on the President Kennedy assassination. Basically the thrust of the Report is that the Agency, CI in particular, did a very thorough and outstanding job in investigating all Mexican and Soviet aspects of the Kennedy assassination. The criticism in the Report, however, as it is directed against CIA, centers on the activities of the Special Activities Staff, headed by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald. According to the Report, while the Agency in support of the FBI's investigation went to great lengths to trace the activities of Oswald in the Soviet Union and in Mexico, similar in-depth research as it related to the Cubans was not done. This is attributed to the compartmentation of the Cuban operations as they related to assassination plans against Fidel Castro. The SSC Report has selected the AMLASH/1 case as an example of this type of activity, and concentrated on it. The Report takes the position that the CIA leadership being knowledgeable of these activities which may have caused Castro to take retaliatory measures, and possibly resulted in the assassination of President Kennedy, did not make this information available to the Warren Commission. Therefore, the Agency's leadership, in the Reports view, withheld vital information from the Commission which may have changed its findings.

2. The Report is highly critical of the FBI.

3. The following represent my comments related to only three items in the Report which are within my area of competence. Other comments prepared by Messrs. Breckinridge and Sturbitts are attached.

a. Page 10. "Oswald contacted a known KGB agent" with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.

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
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Comment: While it is known that Oswald contacted the Vice Consul at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, to the best of our knowledge it was for the purpose of obtaining a visa for the Soviet Union. The fact that the Vice Consul happened to be a KGB officer complicates the matter but there is no evidence that Oswald knew this Soviet was KGB. Therefore, recommend this sentence be modified accordingly.

b. Page 53. Believe the word "technical" should be removed when referring to CIA collection capability in Mexico City.

c. Question arose as to whether identification of the KGB officer in Mexico City and his relationship to Department 13 of the KGB may touch on revealing depth of CIA knowledge about the KGB in 1963. I checked with Mr. Ben Pepper, C/SE/X/CI who feels that nothing is lost by this identification. Recommend the information in question be allowed to stand as is.

4. As you'll note from attached there is a meeting to discuss the Report on Tuesday at 1400 in the Review Staff Conference room. Unless I hear to the contrary, I'll attend on behalf of CI Staff.

 23.
Daniel R. Niesciur
CI/OG/SO

Attachment: a/s

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4/7/71